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ABSTRACT
We are all increasingly the subjects of data collection and
processing systems that use data generated both about and
by us to provide and optimise a wide range of services.
Means for others to collect and process data that concerns
each of us { often referred to possessively as \your data" {
are only increasing with the long-heralded advent of the In-
ternet of Things just the latest example. As a result, means
to enable personal data management is generally recognised
as a pressing societal issue.
We have previously proposed that one such means might
be realised by theDatabox, a collection of physical and cloud-
hosted software components that provide for an individual
data subject to manage, log and audit access to their data
by other parties. In this paper we elaborate on this proposal,
describing the software architecture we are developing, and
the current status of a prototype implementation. We con-
clude with a brief discussion of Databox's limitations.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Increased ubiquity of sensing via mobile and IoT devices
has caused a surge in personal data generation and use.
Alongside this surge, concerns over privacy, trust, and secu-
rity are becoming increasingly important as dierent stake-
holders attempt to take advantage of such rich data re-
sources: occurrences of breaches of privacy are rising at
alarming rates [15]. Tensions in the collection and use of
personal data, between the benets to various analytics ap-
plications, the privacy consequences and security risks, and
the regulatory complexities of aggregating and processing
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data in the cloud are a signicant barrier to innovation in
this space. We have previously proposed that these topics,
and the shortcomings of current approaches in this space,
are the concern of a new { or at least, newly focused { dis-
cipline, Human-Data Interaction (HDI) [19].
In our view the core technical problem in this space is
how to build networked services that enable individuals to
manage their personal data so that they can permit other
parties to make use of it while retaining personal control
over such uses and understanding the implications of any
data release. As digital data may be copied innitely at
negligible marginal cost and without loss of delity, the cur-
rent common approach of centralising unencrypted personal
data into a cloud-hosted service such as Google or Facebook
is fundamentally awed in this regard. Once data is given up
to such a service, the data subject can only exercise control
over it to the extent that the cloud provider allows them,
and they have only social means (e.g., negative publicity
campaigns, local per-jurisdiction regulation) to ensure such
controls are provided.1
Our response is to provide technical means to assist the
data subject in managing access to their data by others. As
we have previously proposed, the Databox is an open-source
personal networked device augmented by cloud-hosted ser-
vices that collates, curates, and mediates access to our per-
sonal data, under the data subject's control [11]. It sits
within an ecosystem of networked devices and associated
services enabling individuals to manage their data, and to
provide other parties with controlled access to their data.
Composed of a set of service instances, realised as Docker-
managed containers in our current prototype, it enables Cloud-
Assisted Networking through the placement of these instances
in dierent locations, from a physical device in the subject's
home, to the public cloud, to future envisioned edge-network
hosting resources such as smart lampposts and cell-towers.
Databox not only benets data subjects by providing a
regulated and privacy-enhanced communication mechanism
between data subjects and data processors. Acting as an
agent on behalf of the data subject, it can support queries
1We follow standard legal terminology and refer to individ-
uals about whom data is collected from sources such as IoT
sensors or online social network accounts as data subjects,
and organisations wishing to process data as data proces-
sors.
over high-resolution personal data that would be dicult
for a single company to obtain, permitting richer, more ac-
curate data analytics. It also helps avoid the risks of data
breach associated with collecting and curating large, per-
sonal datasets which malicious actors have signicant incen-
tives to attack and steal.
In this paper we explore the software architecture of the
Databox, and describe in more detail how we envisage it
being used. We rst briey survey related approaches to
supporting capture and processing of personal data (x2).
We then set out the software architecture of our current
prototype, focusing on the four primary components: store,
driver, manager and apps (x3). We then briey discuss how
we envisage data processing and analytics taking place in a
world of Databoxes (x4). We nish by describing the status
and initial performance of our current prototype (x5) and
concluding (x6).
2. PERSONAL DATA MANAGEMENT
Personal data collection for proling and mining users'
interests and relationships is the basis on which online plat-
forms such as Facebook and Google and services such as Ap-
ple's Siri and Microsoft's Cortana operate. However, such
data collection and proling exposes the user to privacy leak-
age even when these communities are anonymous [6]. Simul-
taneously, these cloud-based services can have only a partial
view of each data subject's digital footprint, resulting in in-
accuracies and systemic biases in the data they hold, and
leading to ever more aggressive data collection strategies.
Building privacy, trust and security into the evolving dig-
ital ecosystem is thus broadly recognized as a key societal
challenge. Regulatory activities in the US [28], Europe [8]
and Japan [26] are complemented by industry initiatives
that seek to rebalance the \crisis in trust" [29] occasioned by
widespread personal data harvesting. All parties agree that
increased accountability and control are key to this chal-
lenge. Accountability seeks not only to strengthen compli-
ance but also to make the emerging ecosystem more trans-
parent to consumers, while control seeks to empower con-
sumers and provide them with the means of actively exer-
cising choice.
Although numerous mechanisms supporting privacy pre-
serving analytics, marketing and advertising have been pro-
posed, e.g., recent studies on analysing network traces us-
ing dierential privacy [7] and accessing databases while re-
specting privacy [17, 24], no operational system exists that
also gives others visibility into statistics and trends [13, 10,
12]. Rieel et al. [25] propose cryptographic, hierarchical
access to data for processing aggregate statistics without de-
crypting personal data. However this method still requires
collection of individual data items and complex yet critical
management of many cryptographic keys. Privacy-aware
centralised methods such as homomorphic encryption [21]
are yet to be deployed in a commercial or consumer sys-
tem. While these methods are likely to be important in
the future, they are not enough alone: they cannot provide
accountability and control in isolation.
Numerous recent and current projects and startups have
responded to specic problems of aggressive data collec-
tion by the online advertising industry2 through more tra-
2http://www.technologyreview.com/view/530741/
the-murky-world-of-third-party-web-tracking/
ditional means. These typically involve production of ser-
vices called variously Personal Data Stores, Personal Infor-
mation Management System, Vendor Relationship Manage-
ment, and similar; examples include Mydex [1] and open-
PDS [5]. They allow the subject to retain \ownership" of
their data and provide it to third parties on demand [23],
which oers some degree of accountability and control but
only insofar as the service provider can be trusted. Simple
notions of\ownership"are also problematic, a point to which
we return in (x6).
Our approach, the Databox, is a set of networked service
enabling individuals to manage their data, and to provide
other parties with controlled access to their data. It gathers
data from local and remote sources, from online social net-
works to IoT sensors; provides for data subjects to inspect
data gathered from their data sources, and to eect actua-
tion via IoT devices and similar; enables data processors to
discover and request access to subjects with sources of in-
terest; and it supports running applications to provide data
processors with specic, limited, logged access to subjects'
data.
3. INSIDE THE DATABOX
Given currently available infrastructure, we expect the
common-case Databox deployment to be a hybrid of a lo-
cal physical device (or devices) and cloud-hosted services.
The physical instances might come in the form-factor of an
augmented home broadband router, and provide several af-
fordances not easily available to a pure cloud-hosted solu-
tion: direct physical control (e.g., you can unplug the de-
vice and be certain no-one can access your data through it);
co-location (e.g., imposing data access policies referring to
shared data such as from a smart energy meter might require
the physical presence of more than one data subject); prox-
imity (e.g., data access might require that the data subject
is physically present at the moment when access is granted);
and the intuitiveness of physical interaction (e.g., as with the
Homework Router [20], selected policies might be imposed
and relaxed by the introduction or removal of a colour-coded
USB key to the device). Note that the software architecture
of the Databox means that as other cloud-hosting becomes
available, such as those hosted in the edge network, in cell-
towers, in automobiles, in lampposts, the Databox will be
able to take advantage of these facilities.
3.1 Threat Model & Design Principles
Before laying out the design principles to which we ad-
here we must briey discuss those threats we set out to deal
with and those we do not. Specically, we are not propos-
ing the Databox as a generic solution to problems of online
anonymity or security. Rather, it is intended to provide
means for individuals to understand and manage the uses
made of their personal data, per the core themes of HDI
(legibility, agency, and negotiability).
This motivates the approach of Databox: data processing
is mediated by and hosted on the Databox itself, even where
raw data is held outside the Databox (e.g., your online social
network data). This is in stark contrast to the widespread
current approach whereby personal data is handed over to
some organisation through which it can be managed. By
avoiding this, we can ensure detailed and coherent logging
of all operations carried out on the subject's personal data,
as well as tight control over the release of data derived from
the processing of your personal data.
As with all edge-cloud solutions, this greatly reduces the
attack surface: it is no longer the case that a single misplaced
click can release the records of millions of users { instead,
millions of clicks are required. We also signicantly reduce
the core temptation of an honest-but-curious attacker who
would otherwise be in the position of holding many users'
personal data: as accesses must now be via each individual's
Databox, the payo of simultaneous access to millions of
records is reduced.
With that starting point in mind, we attempt to separate
concerns, distinguishing data collection from storage from
access. In practice this translates to:
All components are clearly separated. Databox fol-
lows a micro-services pattern: components are separated at
as low an OS layer as possible, and inter-communicate using
explicit APIs. This also helps ensure portability between
physical device and cloud hosting. Our prototype uses con-
tainers to provide this separation; future implementations
might provide stronger separation through use of unikernels
or virtual machines [2, 18].
Distinct data sources are represented by distinct
stores. This helps to ensure that an attacker who gains
access to one store does not, de facto, gain access to any
other store without performing privilege escalation against
the host platform.
Components are disconnected by default. This de-
creases the likelihood of breach by narrowing the window of
opportunity for an attacker. Any network-connected system
can be attacked at any time: by ensuring that components
that do not need to be connected remain disconnected, the
number of components an attacker can attack is reduced
to a small number of components that must necessarily be
reachable all the time; particular attention can be paid to
hardening these.
All control and data ow is logged to enable subse-
quent audit. This increases the likelihood that, in case of
data breach, the source of breach can be traced and the as-
sociated risks and costs can be quantied and mitigated. In
light of the preceding principle, component inter-connection
is thus via purpose-specic bridges that are able to validate
the identity of the external party making the connection via
(e.g.,) TLS Client Certicates.
3.2 Prototype Architecture
Figure 1 depicts the software architecture of the Databox.
There are four core components at the heart of the Databox
which we describe next: (i) driver, (ii) stores, (iii) the man-
ager, and (iv) apps.
Drivers. Each data source is represented in the Databox
via a driver. In common with many device driver models,
the driver can be thought of as the coupling of a frontend and
backend. The backend is source-dependent, and responsible
for all interaction with the source. The frontend is the stan-
dardised interface provided by the attached store, through
which other components interact with the backend. Drivers
read and write (or collect and actuate) in response to invo-
cations made on their store(s). Each driver is responsible
for exactly one source; each source has exactly one driver on
a given Databox.
Stores. The Databox contains many data stores, either
primary or derived, all implementing the same standard
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Figure 1: Proposed Databox architecture. Drivers
interface external devices (sensors and actuators)
into the Databox. All invocations and data ow
through stores, which log operations and (poten-
tially) data. Apps consume data from stores and
publish results into new stores. The Manager en-
ables access to selected stores by external data pro-
cessors.
API. Primary stores connect to drivers, and record \raw"
data collected directly. All accesses through a store, whether
read or write, are logged into a distinct, system provided
store, which makes them available for subsequent visuali-
sation and audit. Accesses to stores depend on permission
being granted via the Manager.
Manager. A Databox contains a set of management func-
tions: (i) container manager, managing container instances;
(ii) directory, recording all installed drivers and applications,
aiding discovery; (iii) bridge, providing interconnection be-
tween running components; and (iv) arbiter, responsible for
managing interactions between components, and between
components and external parties. In particular, the arbiter
is responsible for minting and validating tokens permitting
external parties to connect to stores, and for enabling con-
nectivity between drivers, applications, derived stores, and
external processors.
Apps. Finally, the Databox hosts isolated applications
provided by third parties. These perform the actual data
processing required to provide specic services. Applica-
tions then connect to one or more stores (either primary
or derived) and record into derived stores data resulting
from computations carried out on the contents of their in-
put stores. Thanks to the logging inherent in each store, all
accesses (reads and writes) are recorded separately for later
audit.
All these components are open-source, and applications
then interact with them over TLS via published APIs. We
next discuss the ways we envisage processing taking place
across multiple Databoxes.
4. DATA PROCESSING & ANALYTICS
As the primary purpose of the Databox is to support an
ecosystem around processing of personal data, applications
are a key part of the architecture: how they are discovered,
installed and operate.
We envisage that all Databox applications will involve
some software component running within the Databox. Specif-
ically, applications provide derived stores to which external
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Figure 2: Databox congured to capture an individual's online activity, in all locations, across all devices.
parties (whether data processing organisations or a browser
operated by the data subject) can connect. These applica-
tions provide accountable entities through which the data
subject can ascribe to a data processor behaviour involving
use of their data. We envisage two main routes to instal-
lation of these components, resulting from successful nego-
tiation between the data subject and processor causing the
processor to be given access to the subject's data: subject-
driven and processor-driven.
Subject-driven. This model is strongly analogous to
current app store models. Each app store is a service to
which subjects can connect to discover applications they
might wish to install. Apps advertise the data stores that
they will consume, the frequency at which they will access
those stores, and the computation they will carry out on
data from those stores. Apps will be validated and veried
by the app store operators, and rated by the community.
They will have only limited, approved external communica-
tions between their own store and an authenticated client.
Processor-driven. This model inverts the interaction,
enabling data processors to discover cohorts of data subjects
who have data available to meet the processor's needs.
Independent of the discovery model used, applications
may either be limited to 1:1 interactions, or may necessarily
involve a larger cohort of subjects making data available. In
the former case, the output of the computation is consumed
in isolation, either by the data subject or the data processor.
In the latter, there is an inherent need for the application
to function as a distributed system, with communication
taking place between instances as the computation makes
progress. This latter case is considerably more complicated
so we discuss it briey next.
Three key challenges of this sort of application present
themselves: scale, heterogeneity, and dynamics. These
challenges arise due to the fundamental characteristics of the
algorithms and deployment environments envisaged. Data
processors might use machine learning and model generation
algorithms that default to serial computation or, at best,
execute in the controlled, high bandwidth, low latency envi-
ronment of a datacenter. Scaling them across (potentially)
millions of Databoxes moves most of these algorithms out-
side their normal operating regions. The computation re-
sources on which they will be hosted will vary in capacity
and connectivity, making scheduling and synchronisation of
ongoing computations between instances considerably more
complex, Finally, physical Databox instances are likely to
have variable and unreliable connectivity which, when cou-
pled with the envisaged scale, almost guarantees that the
entire cohort will never be simultaneously available.
Approaches to addressing these challenges that we are ex-
ploring include the use of techniques such as delay-tolerant
querying, introduced in the Seaweed database [22], where
metadata statistics are incorporated into the decisions taken
by the system as to when to wait for data to become avail-
able and when to give up and return (with appropriate in-
dications) a potentially inaccurate answer; and more ex-
ible control over synchronisation barriers than permitted
by Bulk Synchronous Parallel operation (e.g., Stale Syn-
chronous Parallel Parameter Server [14]).
It is possible that other factors inherent in these data
and the deployment of Databoxes may also mitigate against
some of these problems. For example, the distributed com-
putations may well be highly localised and so might be
loosely coupled and require minimal coordination and ex-
change of data. Coupled with use of aggregation in the
computation graph, this might mitigate unreliability and
scale, while also providing natural means to support privacy-
preserving aggregation.
5. CURRENT STATUS
We are in the process of building a rst complete, open-
source prototype of the Databox. The hardware platform
consists of the Docker Cloud for cloud-hosted components
and small form-factor PCs (Intel NUCs and Raspberry Pis)
for the locally-hosted components. The software platform is
based around the Docker container management platform,
with each software component instantiated and managed as
a container. Use of Docker makes support for dierent plat-
forms and architectures substantially more replicable and
straightforward, as well as ensuring a familiar and portable
development environment. We are currently pursuing two
application domains: (i) individual online behaviour across
the multiple network-connected devices most of us now use;
and (ii) domestic Internet of Things across a wide range of
sensors and actuators targeting household settings.
In the rst case we will capture information about our on-
line interactions with people and companies using a range
of devices including tablets, phones, and traditional PCs.
This data is often already captured but typically only by
other parties, from ISPs to social media companies to retail-
ers { the result is that it is usually opaque to us, and every
company forms only a partial and inaccurate picture of our
behaviours.
The current prototype, depicted in Figure 2, sets up drivers
that run IKEv2/IPSec VPN and Socks/HTTP proxy servers,
and the drivers then dump captured data into a store. Both
drivers and stores are implemented as Docker containers,
and a further container hosts a webserver that provides con-
guration instructions, customised to the connecting device,
for each of these services. The subject congures their mo-
bile devices to communicate via on or both of these, allowing
the subject to log the network activity of their devices and
applications.
From initial performance tests we nd that latency and
throughput are within 80% when VPN and SOCKS proxies
are hosted in the cloud, but (as expected) are signicantly
degraded (throughput reduced by over 70% and latency sim-
ilarly aected when installed on the low power ARM-based
devices). Although this is an unoptimised setup, when cou-
pled with the usual problems of connectivity through home
gateways, this seems to support the hybrid approach and
suggests that correctly managing heterogeneous resources
will be a key challenge.
The second case involves conguring drivers and stores on
the Databox to capture data from a range of domestic sen-
sors and to interact with installed actuators. The current
prototype already interfaces to a range of o-the-shelf sen-
sors (accelerometers plus CO2, temperature and humidity
detectors), as well as standard smartphone hardware sen-
sors available via iOS and Android. We have also developed
a visual programming environment that allows simple cre-
ation of IoT apps to run on the Databox.
6. DISCUSSION & CONCLUSIONS
We have briey presented the software architecture for
the Databox, a hybrid locally- and cloud-hosted system for
personal data management. While it addresses concerns of
privacy and ethics of these data, it does not try simply to
prevent all such analysis and use by third-parties as not all
of this activity is harmful [3, 16]. Rather, it seeks to aord
users the possibility to nd personal equilibria with sharing
and use of their data: simply preventing all access to per-
sonal data would fail to take advantage of the many potential
benets that sharing data can produce, whether immediate
nancial rewards, social benets through, e.g., participation
in friendship groups, or broad societal benets from the abil-
ity to participate in large-scale studies in, e.g., human mo-
bility and activity for use in urban planning, or mental and
physical health measures used to set healthcare norms.
The current prototype implementation is a rst step to
realisation and evaluation of our proposed architecture. Use
of Docker containers provides a very convenient way to ex-
periment with the structure of the system in these initial
stages. Longer term we are interested in exploring use of
unikernels, such as MirageOS [18], to implement some of
the very specic and limited functionality software compo-
nents that are security critical such as those responsible for
authenticating and conguring connectivity to applications
and drivers, as well as the store, perhaps by building on
Irmin [9] libraries to produce a store where all read/write
operations are logged.
While we believe that the Databox will be useful in and
of itself, the present design is clearly not the nal word in
personal data management. Although personal data man-
agement is generally considered an intensely personal mat-
ter [27], it is also inherently social: it is impractical to with-
draw from all online activity simply to protect one's pri-
vacy [4]. Similarly many households have multiple occupants
and data sources may therefore be inherently accountable to
several data subjects. What can be done to enable meaning-
ful engagement in the management of such shared personal
data is an open challenge at present.
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